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Abstract
We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individ-
uals in a family contribute to a pure public good and/or a household
public good, and, at the same time, the parent makes private transfers
to her child within the same family. We show not only that Warr’s
neutrality holds regardless of the diﬀerent timings of parent-to-child
transfers, but also that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in
the sense that individuals’ contributions and parental transfers are
indeterminate, although the allocation of each’s private consumption
and total public good provision is uniquely determined. We further
show that, even in the presence of impure altruism or productivity
diﬀerence in supplying public goods, neutrality and uniqueness of the
equilibrium allocation may persist.
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The standard framework for the analysis of private provision of public goods
is the Nash-Cournot model in which agents choose their contributions si-
multaneously and independently. An important assumption of these models
is that each contributor is a single individual or else a private organization
which behaves as a single player in provision games. In reality, most volun-
tary public goods are contributed by a variety of groups consisting of het-
erogenous agents, such as private companies, NPO’s, groups of volunteers,
families and so on, in the society rather than individuals. Torsvik (1994)
recognizes the importance of this observation, and shows how a representa-
tive democracy may induce each group to act strategically in the election of
representatives who subsequently decide the contribution to a public good
when several groups voluntarily contribute towards the public good. In this
paper we particularly focus on the contributing behavior of the family to
public goods. Each family comprises several heterogeneous agents character-
ized by diﬀerent preferences as well as diﬀerent income sources - for example,
a given family may consist of a husband, a wife, children, a grandmother, and
so on. Families make signiﬁcant voluntary contributions to public goods in
the real world. Furthermore, members of a given family strategically interact
with each other, not only through voluntary contributions to household pub-
lic goods, but also through voluntary income transfers. Thus their collective
contribution decisions to contribute to public goods may be quite diﬀerent
from that of a single agent. Our main task is to clarify the implications
for income redistribution policy between diﬀerent families rather than be-
tween members of a given family (see, e.g., Konrad and Lommerud, 1995);
in particular, given the complicated collective decisions within a family, we
examine whether Warr’s neutrality theorem holds or not.
The literature on family economics long ago moved away from modeling a
family as a single decision unit. Researchers now routinely make extensive use
of game theoretical modelling, using either a cooperative or a non-cooperative
approach. Apps and Rees (2009) provide a good survey of the present state
of research on the behaviour of multi-person households. The cooperative ap-
proach, which assumes eﬃciency, originated from the Nash bargaining model
of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). Although
most subsequent work assumes that households are cooperative, there are at
least two potential problems with bargaining models. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h e
implementation and enforcement of cooperative agreements within marriage
requires couples to incur transaction costs. The second is that empirical
evidence does not support the hypothesis that households are organized ef-
ﬁciently. This “eﬃciency” assumption has been relaxed by Lundberg and
1Pollak (1993), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Chen and Woolley (2001),
which consider a Nash bargaining model with non-cooperative Nash equilib-
rium threat points.1
The cooperative bargaining models proposed by Lundberg and Pollak
(1983), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Chen and Woolley (2001) have
some features of the non-cooperative models. However, Konrad and Lom-
merud (1995) go further and develop a fully non-cooperative model in which
two family members non-cooperatively choose his or her time allocation be-
tween market work and household production of a household public good
without relying on a bargaining process. They ﬁnd that lump-sum redistrib-
ution from one spouse to the other may alter the intrafamily equilibrium out-
come. Furthermore, such redistribution may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Many decisions within a household can be analyzed in a non-cooperative
model. Ashworth and Ulph (1981) analyze the strategic labor supply deci-
sions of family members, while Anderberg (2007) analyzes the mix of gov-
ernment spending. We also employ the fully non-cooperative family game
i nt h es p i r i to fK o n r a da n dL o m m e r u d( 1 995) in order to avoid transaction
costs as well as the unrealistic “eﬃciency” hypothesis. Moreover, our model
departs from their model in two further respects.
The non-cooperative games within the family described so far are in
the tradition of the voluntary contributions game analysed by Warr (1983),
Cornes and Sandler (1985) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). These models,
in common with the core results of the basic public good provision model,
predict that household public goods will generally be underprovided. This
common feature arises from the presence of a household public good whose
beneﬁts are enjoyed by members of the same family. Examples might include
housework, a beautiful garden, a clean house, care for sick family members,
the well-being of elderly parents and children, and so on. At the same time,
households also voluntarily contribute to many public goods whose beneﬁts
spill over to members of other families (which we call “interfamily” public
goods to distinguish them from “intrafamily” or “household” public goods).
Such contributions include donations to charities, and community orchestras,
various volunteer activities and so on. Even an attractive garden usually has
a spillover eﬀect on neighbors, and thus it can be viewed as generating both
intra- and interfamily public goods. Every family member has the oppor-
1Lundberg and Pollak (1983) consider a threat point to be a "separate sphere" contri-
bution equilibrium where socially prescribed gender roles assign the primary responsibility
for certain public goods to the wife and others to the husband, while Konrad and Lom-
merud (2000) and Chen and Woolley (2001) deﬁne a threat point as the utility levels
obtained from the spouses’ non-cooperative decisions of human capital investments and
contributions to a household public good prior to the bargaining, respectively.
2tunity of purchasing “environmentally friendly” goods and services such as
hybrid or electric cars, energy-saving electrical appliances. Moreover, they
have the opportunity of purchasing green-electricity which is generated with
renewable souses of energy such as solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass.
Purchases of this provide an environmental public good as a result of a re-
duction in pollution emissions associated with increased production of green
electricity. Hence, a more realistic model allows family members to con-
tribute to both intra- and interfamily public goods in day-to-day life. This
extension is not only motivated by theoretical concerns, but also is to reveal
new implications for a redistribution policy. Although Konrad and Lom-
merud (1995) found the well-known non-neutrality of redistribution policy
between spouses in the presence of productivity diﬀerence between spouses
in supplying a household public good, their model contains neither volun-
tary income transfers nor voluntary contributions to an interfamily public
good. We examine an income redistribution policy between diﬀerent families
rather than within family members in a situation where family members are
connected through those channels.
The second departure from the non-cooperative family model is that, ei-
ther because family members care about each other or for other motivations
such as self-interested exchange (e.g., Bernheim et al., 1985), they make pri-
vate income transfers within the family in addition to their contributions to
public goods. Consider, for example, alumni giving to private colleges and
universities. The parents makes direct income transfers to their children in
order to pay their tuition and support their living; at the same time, the
parents may give as alumni to these colleges and universities which can be
viewed as a voluntary contribution to a public good. Therefore, it is very
natural to tie together two diﬀerent stands in the literature; voluntary provi-
sion to public goods and the economics of family which analyzes provision to
household public goods and income transfers among family members. Such
a hybrid model is consistent with common empirical observations and would
provide new theoretical implications to both ﬁelds as well.
Our analysis reveals three major ﬁndings. First, even if the distribution of
income among individuals is ﬁxed, an inﬁnite number of combinations of pri-
vate contributions to a public good, including a household public good, and
intrafamily transfers may be compatible with a unique proﬁle of individual
private consumptions and the total supply of public good. In other words,
there is a continuum of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria in the strategy
space of individual voluntary contributions. This non-uniqueness property
contrasts sharply with the result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) in which, when
agents have convex preferences deﬁned over a private good and a normal
public good, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, with a unique set of
3individual contributions and the total provision of public good.
The source of this non-uniqueness result is straightforward. Suppose a
parent simultaneously makes two types of voluntary contributions; private
donations to interfamily public goods and parental altruistically motivated
transfers to their child. From the viewpoint of the parent, both contribu-
tions would be regarded as perfect substitutes for provisions to the same
public good, although such private transfers would be indirect contributions
to that public good via the well-being of the child. Yet, we shall show that
this intuition is not suﬃcient to account for the non-uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium.
The main focus of our model is on the timing of parental transfers to chil-
dren in the presence of voluntary contributions to interfamily public goods.
In the literature there are two possible timings of parent-to-child transfers;
more precisely, the parent makes private transfers to a selﬁsh child either
before or after observing the child’s action (i.e., ex-ante or ex-post transfers,
respectively). Assuming further that the parent both contributes to public
goods and also makes parent-to-child transfers (which is the most plausible
assumption), we demonstrate the robustness of Warr’s (1983) neutrality the-
orem by considering these diﬀerent sequential orders of actions chosen by the
parent and child. Put diﬀerently, the neutrality result is independent of the
details of the environment in which strategic behavior associated with the
timing of parent’s transfers, which is our second major ﬁnding.
Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) have argued that the presence of inter-
family linkages through a common child produced by originally unrelated
individuals may make government policies, such as public transfers, distor-
tionary taxation and so on, neutral in the sense that those policies have
no real eﬀect. The neutrality property they found, which is called “cross
sectional neutrality”, is much stronger than Barro’s neutrality which works
through altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers. Bernheim and
Bagwell’s cross sectional neutrality operates through interfamily transfers
based on marital connections.2 In addition to such links provided by altru-
istically motivated transfers, we introduce an interfamily public good which
provides another possible link connecting individuals in diﬀerent families as
well as within the same family. We show not only that the latter link acts as
a perfect substitute for the link of operative interfamily transfers assumed in
the model of Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), but also that the introduction of
the strategic motives for transfers (i.e., diﬀerent sequential orders of trans-
fers) does not aﬀect the likelihood of Bernheim and Bagwell’s cross sectional
2However, Laitner (1991) points out that when material connections are explicitly
modeled via a market for marriage, this neutrality is not robust.
4neutrality. Indeed, the presence of voluntarily supplied public goods will en-
hance Bernheim and Bagwell’s cross sectional neutrality in the sense that
even if interfamily transfers are not operative, the redistribution neutrality
h o l d sa sl o n ga sp r i v a t ed o n a t i o n st oap u b l i cg o o da r eo p e r a t i v e .
Cornes and Itaya (2010) show that in a one-shot, Nash provision game
with many public goods, any income redistribution has no eﬀect on the orig-
inal equilibrium allocation, as long as that redistribution occurs within a
set of linked individuals who are eventually connected each other through
eﬀective private contributions to many interfamily public goods. They call
it “partial neutrality”. We shall show that their linkage concept plays a key
role in generating the neutrality as well as non-uniqueness of an equilibrium
allocation in the present two-stage provision game. In our model we deﬁne
a“ l i n k ”a se i t h e rpositive parent-to-child transfers or positive private dona-
tions to interfamily public goods, and then show that when a redistribution
of income is undertaken among the linked individuals who are eventually con-
nected each other through the latter link, neutrality arises. Moreover, if the
number of links is larger than the minimum number of links which connect
individuals, the indeterminacy in terms of choice variables at the node where
extra links emerge arises.
The third ﬁnding is that even if parents or children stop contributing to a
public good, the neutrality with respect to a redistribution of income involv-
ing those non-contributing agents may remain valid, as long as the parental
transfers are operative. In other words, even if we take “non-contributors”a t
face value; namely, the individuals who do not contribute a positive amount
to the public good, the redistribution policy either between non-contributors
or between contributors and non-contributors may not destroy neutrality, as
long as they are connected through operative private transfers. Accordingly,
our ﬁnding has not been addressed in the literature on private provision of
public goods (see, e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1986) in which a redistribution of
income among individuals involving non-contributors usually negates neu-
trality. Although Konrad and Lommerud (1995) demonstrate that the in-
trafamily equilibrium outcome by lump-sum redistribution from one spouse
to the other is not neutral, and, moreover, such redistribution might lead to
a Pareto improvement. The presence of a second channel through which in-
dividuals are linked — speciﬁcally through the possibility of income transfers
—h a st h es i g n i ﬁcant implication that neutrality continues to hold even when
those individuals diﬀer with respect to their productivities as public good
contributors.
Abel and Bernheim (1991) observe that frictions such as impure altruism,
incomplete information about others’ preferences and egalitarian social norms
that constrain parents to divide their transfers evenly among children, may
5destroy Bernheim and Bagwell’s cross sectional neutrality. Nevertheless, we
show that even if there are such frictions, neutrality and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium may persist. This ﬁnding makes a sharp contrast with
that of Andreoni (1990) in which introducing a “warm glow” (i.e., impure
altruism) destroys Warr’s neutrality result. Again, the presence of transfers
preserves and/or voluntary provision of public goods the neutrality property
in the presence of such frictions.
Section 2 presents a basic model. Section 3 considers the two-stage pro-
vision game with ex-post transfers to children. Section 4 considers the two-
stage provision game with pre-committed transfers to children. Section 5
considers the two-stage provision game where diﬀerent families adopt the dif-
ferent modes of transfers; one of the families adopt ex-ante transfers, while
another family adopts ex-post transfers. Section 6 derives conﬁgurations of
each family member’s contribution and transfer associated with diﬀerent in-
come distributions under Cobb-Douglas preferences. Section 7 considers the
case of impure altruism. Section 7 considers the basic model augmented with
the inclusion of a household public good. Section 9 concludes the paper with
a discussion of some possible extensions of the model.
2T h e M o d e l
In this paper, without loss of generality, we consider an economy of two
families, each consisting of a single altruistic parent and a single selﬁsh child.
Within family i, whose members are identiﬁed by the superscript i,T h e
















k,G), i =1 ,2, (1)
where ci
p and ci
k are, respectively, the parent’s and child’s consumptions of
the private good, G is an interfamily public good, αi is the parameter which
measures the strength of parent i’s altruism towards her child. The utility
functions of the parent and child, denoted respectively by ui
p and ui
k,a r e
twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly quasi-concave, strictly increasing
in each argument and ∂ui
h/∂ci
h →∞as ci
h → 0 for i =1 ,2 and h = p,k.3
We assume that ci
p (and ci
k) and G are normal goods. We further assume
that αi ∈ [0,1], which implies that the parent neither cares about her child
more than herself nor hates her child. To make the analysis simpler, we here
3Although the form of the utility function given by (1) has been commonly used in the
literature on family economics, it is easy to show that the results obtained in the present





6omit a purely intrafamily (household) public good, but we will introduce one
in Section 8.
The public good G is an interfamily public good whose beneﬁts spill
over to members of the other family. Moreover, the public good is entirely
supplied by voluntary contributions made by the parent and child, gi
p and gi
k
of family i =1 ,2, respectively. The public good is thus produced according












3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Ex-post
Transfers
In this section we consider a two-stage contribution game in which the child
and parent play sequentially, and characterize the resulting subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (or simply SPE). We shall consider three diﬀerent timings
t h a tt h ep a r e n ta n dc h i l dp l a y . W eﬁrst investigate the following timing of
actions (which we call Game I). In stage 1, the child of family i chooses her
own consumption, ci
k, and contribution to the public good, gi
k.I n s t a g e 2 ,
after having observed the contributions made by the children of both families,
(g1
k, g2
k), the parent of family i chooses ci
p and gi
p (or equivalently, πi and gi
p)

















where πi represents the transfer from the parent of family i to her child,
and yi
p and yi
k are the ﬁxed incomes of the parent and child of family i,
respectively.
We use backward induction to solve the parent’s optimization problem









































k + πi − gi
k,G)
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=0 , i =1 ,2.( 7 )
Since (6) and (7) form the system of equations in gi








k) and ˆ π
i (g1
k,g 2
k), i =1 ,2. Given the optimal contribution and trans-
fer functions ˆ gi
p (g1
k,g2
k) and ˆ π
i (g1
k,g2
k) for i =1 ,2, the child’s maximizing





























k.T h eﬁrst-order conditions for an

































=0 , i =1 ,2.( 8 )















+1=0 , i =1 ,2, (9)
which automatically leads to the condition that ∂Ui
k/∂gi
k =0for i =1 ,2.
This implies that the ﬁrst-order conditions (8) are satisﬁed for any interior
values of gi
k, i =1 ,2, that give rise to interior values of the functions πi, gi
p
in Stage 1, so that indeterminacy in terms of gi
k arises.5
Next, we investigate how income redistribution aﬀects the equilibrium
allocation derived above - that is, whether the so-called neutrality theorem
4An interior equilibrium with (πi,gi
p,gi
k) > 0, i =1 ,2,m a yn o tgenerically exist, as
shown in Cornes and Itaya (2010). We will conﬁrm its existence by examining a speciﬁc
model with Cobb-Douglas preferences in Section 6.





k) in its own con-
tribution is concave (i.e., its second derivative is equal to zero), the second-order condition
is certainly satisﬁed. Moreover, it is well documented that when the strategy set of each
player is compact and convex and when each player’s payoﬀ function is quasi-concave in
its own strategy, there exists a Nash equilibrium in this game (see, e.g., Glicksberg, 1952)
8Figure 1: Both parent and child contribute to the public good G.
holds or not. To do this, we assume “small” redistributions of income—that is,
no one suﬀers from a loss in income greater than their initial contributions or
the sum of their initial contribution and intrafamily transfer. Given a set of
changes in incomes dyi

















k, i =1 ,2.( 1 1 )
We claim that these new choices are an SPE of Game I, and since they—
together with the pure-redistribution assumption—imply that dG =0also,
this all implies that Game I exhibits redistributional neutrality for any such
income redistribution.
The key point is that when lump-sum taxes are imposed on, say, the par-
ent of family 1, she can undo their eﬀect either by withdrawing the transfer
to her child, or by reducing her public good contribution, or both, in antici-
pation that the child of family 1 or/and the members of family 2 will receive
a lump-sum transfer of the same amount.
Furthermore, it follows from the budget constraints (3) and (4),i nc o n -
junction with the invariance of ci
k and ci
p, that the resulting indeterminacy
of gi
k entails the indeterminacy of πi and gi
p as well, although the values of
πi+gi
p and thus gi
p+gi
k are uniquely determined for each i.I no t h e rw o r d s ,a n
9inﬁnite number of combinations of gi
k and πi (or equivalently, combinations
of gi
p and πi) are consistent with a unique proﬁle of private consumptions
and the total provision of public good in a SPE.6
As for non-interior solutions, there are several patterns of family mem-
bers’ contributions and transfers, as illustrated in Figures 2-4. We ﬁrst con-
sider the case where only the children of both families are contributors (i.e.,
gi
p =0 , i =1 ,2), which corresponds to Figure 2. In this case we consider
the following hypothetical changes in the contributions of children and the















k, i =1 ,2.( 1 3 )
These hypothetical responses, in conjunction with the budget constraints (3)






















where the second equality follows from (13), while the third equality follows
from (12). In addition, the constancy of the variables ci
p, ci
k and G leaves
the ﬁrst-order conditions (6), (7) and (8) intact as well. Taken together, the
hypothetical responses prescribed by (12) and (13) are fulﬁlled at equilibrium,
thus leading to the neutrality of income redistribution policy. Both πi and
thus gi
k are uniquely determined from (3) and (4),r e s p e c t i v e l y ,f o rπi is a
sole decision variable confronted by the parent.7
6When the child has another choice variable such as a labor supply (i.e., ‘a lazy kid’ in











k,a i) − gi
k, ˆ G,ai),
where yi
k(ai) represents the labor income earned by the child which depends positively
on the child’s labor supply ai,a n di sa s s u m e dt ob eaC2-class function. The optimal




k,a i) has been obtained by solving the ﬁrst-order condition for
the parent’s optimizing problem given by (6) and (7), given that gi
k, g
j
k and ai have been
determined at stage 1. Assuming (10) and (11), we can show that neutrality as well as
indeterminacy hold true in a similar way.
7When all individuals make positive contributions to the public good but the parents
stop the transfers to their children, the resulting case precisely corresponds to the standard
Nash provision game (see, e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1986).
10Figure 2: Only the child contributes to the public good G.
Next, consider the case where only the parents of both families are con-
tributors (i.e., gi
k =0 , i =1 ,2), as illustrated in Figure 3. As before, we
consider the following hypothetical changes in the children’s contributions










i =0 , i =1 ,2.( 1 5 )
In an analogous manner, we can conﬁrm that the hypothetical responses are
fulﬁlled thus resulting in the validity of neutrality, and that πi and gi
p are
uniquely determined from the budget constraint (3) and (4), respectively.
Finally, consider the case depicted in Figure 4 (i.e., g1
k =0and g2
p =0 ).
In this case we assume the following responses of private contributions as


















k,( 1 7 )





11Figure 3: Only the parent contributes to the public good G.
Figure 4: Only the parent contributes to the public good G in family 1, while
only the child contributes to the public good G in family 2.
12Proposition 1 Consider a two-family, two-stage contribution game with
the preferences in (1), where the parents decide how much to make transfers
to the children after having observed the contributions of all children. As-
sume “small”redistributions of income. Then, we have
(i) Neutrality in terms of a redistribution of income as well as indeterminacy
in terms of the private contributions of all family members as well as the
transfers made by the parents hold, provided the contribution of every indi-
vidual and transfers made by the parents are positive;
(ii) If only the parents (only children) of both families are contributors, then
the SPE is unique, but neutrality remains valid, provided that the parents of
both families make positive transfers to their children, and;
(iii) If only the child is a contributor in one family while only the parent is
a contributor in another family, then the SPE is unique, but neutrality re-
mains valid, provided that the parents of both families make positive transfers
to their children.
Varian (1994) investigates a private provision model in which two agents
sequentially choose voluntary contributions to a public good, and ﬁnds that
in a Stackelberg equilibrium where both agents contribute a positive amount
to the public good the neutrality result holds, which is consistent with our
result. Nevertheless, his model does not entail a continuum of Nash equi-
libria. This implies that the concept of a Stackelberg equilibrium itself will
cause redistributional income neutrality but does not suﬃce to generate in-
determinacy.
Statements (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1 have not been addressed in any
of the literature on private provision of public goods. These properties ap-
pear to be similar to Proposition 3 in the multiple-public good model of
Cornes and Itaya (2010) in which, even if two individuals do not contribute
to the same public good, a redistribution of income that is restricted to a set
of “linked individuals”, who are eventually connected each other through ef-
fective (positive) private contributions to voluntarily provided public goods,
has no eﬀect on the original equilibrium allocation (they call it “partial neu-
trality”). However, their analysis is limited to a one-shot, simultaneous Nash
provision game. In light of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that “partial
neutrality” holds true in our model with the sequential order of actions as-
sociated with the Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
In order to clarify the relationship between our current treatment and
the “partial neutrality” of Cornes and Itaya, we have to slightly modify their
deﬁnition of linked individuals as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Individuals i and i0 are linked at an equilibrium if at least
13one of the following conditions holds: (i) there are positive transfers between
i and i0: (ii) they contribute to the same public good.
Clearly, if individuals i and i0 are linked, regardless of whether they be-
long to the same family or not, so too are any two individuals belonging to
the chain, which may consist of operative private transfers within a family
and/or positive private contributions to public goods whose beneﬁts spill
over to members of other families, that links them.8 Using this deﬁnition,
Proposition 1 can be restated in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Consider a two-family, two-stage contribution game with the
preferences in (1), where the parents decide how much to make transfers to
the children after having observed the contributions of all children. An income
redistribution that is restricted to a set of linked individuals, that maintains
the links between them, has no eﬀect on the original equilibrium allocation.
Moreover, if every individual is linked through at least o n el i n ks u p p o r t e db y
positive transfers to her child or positive private contributions to the public
good, neutrality holds. In particular, if every individual is linked through only
one link (we call such links "the minimum set of links"), the uniqueness of
the associated equilibrium proﬁle emerges.
Stated diﬀerently, if there are double links at some node associated with
a particular individual; for instance, the parents simultaneously make both
positive transfers to their children and private contributions to the public
good, indeterminacy as to the associated choice variables emerges.9 In Figure
1 the double links occur at the nodes labeled by Parent in both families and
thus indeterminacy between the parents’ choice variables such as gi
p and πi
8As evident in Deﬁnition 1, the concept of linked individuals is not restricted in the
case involving a single public good and two families, each consisting of a single parent and
a single child. It is straightforward to demonstrate the validity of partial neutrality in the
context of many public goods, many families and many children.
9The concept of "double link" can more carefully be deﬁned using the terminology of
graph theory or the analysis of networks as follows (see, e.g., Jackson , 2008). Since all
nodes including the node labeled G in Figures 1-4 are tied by several links, all graphs or
networks depicted in Figures 1-4 are termed as "the network or graph is connected" since
every two nodes in the network are connected by some path (i.e., a sequence of links) in the
network. Hence, if the network is connected, neutrality emerges as shown in Proposition 1.
Moreover, if one of those links is to be dropped in Figures 2-4, then the network becomes
"disconnected", then the original network is called a "tree"; alternatively, if a connected
network consisting of n nodes has n − 1 links, it is a tree, Therefore, if the network is a
tree, these links conform "the minimum set of links" (which is called as "minimality of a
network" in the analysis of networks), indeterminacy never arises. Thus the concept of
"double link" means that if there are more links than the number of the minimum set of
links, there exist extra links at some node and we call them "double links".
14arises, while in Figures 2-4 there is no double link so that indeterminacy does
not arise. Since in all diagrams all nodes are connected, neutrality arises.
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether or not the property of indetermi-
nacy is robust with respect to the diﬀerent timings of the sequential ordering
of actions. To verify this, we need to further investigate the model with al-
ternative timing of parental transfers and private donations, and the hybrid
model where diﬀerent families adopt diﬀerent timings of transfers and private
donations in the following sections, respectively.10
4 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Pre-committed
Transfers
In this section we suppose that the parent pre-commits to a ﬁxed transfer be-
fore the child chooses her public good contribution. Given the pre-committed
transfer πi, at stage 2 the child chooses her contribution to maximize the
utility function (which we call Game II). More formally, given the transfers
(π1,π2)a n dt h ec o n t r i b u t i o n sm a d eb yt h ep a r e n t s( g1
p,g2
p), after substituting
the budget constraint (4), the child’s decision problem in family i at stage 2














The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing an interior solution for the respective
families are given by
∂ui
k (yi







k + πi − gi
k,G)
∂G
, i =1 ,2.( 1 8 )
Since the ﬁrst-order conditions (18) constitute the system of equations in gi
k







for i =1 ,2. After substitu-
tion of the above optimal consumption and contribution functions into the

















=1 , i =1 ,2.
This implies that the Samuelson’s eﬃciency condition for provision holds within a family.
This is because by making use of the ex-post transfers the parent of each family can inter-
nalize the externality of the public good so that the Rotten-kid theorem (see, e.g., Bruce
and Waldman, 1990) in terms of private provision of public goods holds true. However, it
should be noted that it is not fully Pareto-eﬃcient in the whole society.
15parent’s utility function, the parent’s decision problem in family i at stage 1

















































, i =1 ,2.
















































































We ﬁrst show that the neutrality property holds. We once again consider
hypothetical changes in family member’s private contributions and parental
transfers prescribed by (10) and (11) in response to the redistribution of
income. As before, it is straightforward to show that constant private con-
sumptions of parents and children, as well as constant total provision of
public good, are consistent with the budget constraints (3) and (4),a sw e l l
as the ﬁrst-order conditions (18), (19) and (20). This entails redistributional
income neutrality.
Furthermore, it follows from (B9) and (B10) in Appendix B that the ﬁrst-
order conditions (19) and (20) boil down to a single equation so that there
are too few equations to determine the unknown variables πi and gi
p,i=1 ,2;
consequently, indeterminacy arises, although the values of gi
p + πi and thus
gi
p + gi
k are uniquely determined.
As for non-interior solutions, we have to consider the three cases asso-
ciated with Figures 2-4. Applying the hypothetical changes in individual
contributions and parental private transfers prescribed by either (12) and
(13), (14) and (15),o r(16) and (17) to the respective cases leads to both the
validity of neutrality and the failure of indeterminacy as before.
In summary;
Proposition 2 Consider a two-family, two-stage contribution game with the
preferences in (1), where the children decide how much to make their contri-
butions to the public good after having observed the transfers made by the par-
ents to the children as well as contributions of the parents. Assume “small”
redistributions of income. Then, statements (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition
1h o l dt r u e .
16Hence, Corollary 1 holds as well.
Cornes and Silva (1999) obtain a result similar to ours in that within a
single family framework the voluntary contributions to a household public
good and the transfers to children are indeterminate, when contributions
to the family public good are perfect substitutes. Consequently, there is a
continuum of Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, according to Chiappori and
Werning (2002), Cornes and Silva’s ﬁnding is not robust in the sense that an
interior Nash equilibrium where every child makes a positive contribution is
non-generic.
In contrast, our indeterminacy result holds regardless of the forms of
utility functions which satisfy the standard properties. The key reason un-
derlying our non-uniqueness result is the presence of an additional choice
confronted by the parents, in conjunction with the well-established neutral-
ity property in the literature on voluntary provision of public goods inde-
pendently of the form of utility functions. Suppose that, initially, there is
a minimal set of links. In view of Corollary 1, this means that the original
graph would become disconnected if any one edge — or link — were dropped.
Then adding a link to the original graph (see footnote 9) generates an in-
determinacy of the associated additional choice variable confronted by the
parents.
5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with the Mix
of Ex-post and Pre-committed Transfers
So far we have investigated homogeneous economies in the sense that there
is only one type of family: either all families make ex-post transfers or all
families make pre-committed transfers. We now relax this setting to allow
for the coexistence of those two types of families in the economy. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that the parent of family 1 makes ex-post transfers,
while that of family 2 makes pre-committed transfers (which we call Game
III).
In stage 2, after having observed (g1
k, π2, g2
p), the parent of family 1
chooses π1 and g1
p, while the child of family 2 chooses g2
k. Assuming an interior
solution, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the family 1’s parent and the family



















k + π1 − g1
k,G)
∂G





























=0 ,( 2 3 )
which form the system of equations in g1
p,g 2
k and π1,g i v e ng1
k, π2 and g2
p.





















Given those functions, the child’s maximizing problem in family 1 and





































































.T h eﬁrst-order conditions





















































































































































∂π2.( 2 8 )
Property (27) ensures that ∂U1
k/∂g1
k =0in (24) always holds, which im-
plies that values of g1
k are indeterminate. Moreover, owing to property (28),
both (25) and (26) boil down to a single equation, implying that the divi-
sion between g2
p and π2 is also indeterminate. Furthermore, assuming the
hypothetical responses prescribed by (10) and (11), we can easily verify that
neutrality holds.
11Note that the two expressions in (28) simplify to ∂ˆ g1
p/∂g2
p = ∂ˆ g1
p/∂π2.
18As for non-interior solutions, we have to consider the following four cases;
the ﬁrst three cases correspond to the ones depicted in Figures 2-4, and the
last case to the one opposed to Figure 4, where the only child in family 1 is
a contributor while the only parent of family 2 is a contributor. Assuming
(12) and (13), (14) and (15),a sw e l la s(16) and (17) to the ﬁrst three cases



















to the last case of Game III, respectively, we can establish the validity of
neutrality as well as the uniqueness of the equilibrium proﬁle of private con-
tributions and parental transfers in either case. Since the links appearing
in Figures 2-4 and the last case to the one opposed to Figure 4 consist of
the minimum set of links, these results are compatible with Corollary 1. In
summary:
Proposition 3 Consider a two-family, two-stage contribution game with the
preferences in (1), where the parent of one family makes ex-post transfers to
the child and the parent of the other family makes pre-committed transfers to
the child. Assume “small” redistributions of income. Then, statements (i),
(ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1 hold true.
6 Cobb-Douglas Preferences
This section presents examples of the foregoing arguments. A special example
may help to show algebraically that Warr’s neutrality theorem holds, and,
in particular, enables us to identify the range of income distributions that
are consistent with the existence of an interior equilibrium. To this end, let















k + γk lnG, i =1 ,2, (30)
while the rest of the model is the same as before. To avoid unnecessary
complications, we assume that the degree of parent’s altruism is common,
i.e., α = αi for i =1 ,2.
196.1 Ex-post Transfers
We ﬁrst consider the case of ex-post transfers. Assuming an interior solution
and given gi
k for i =1 ,2,a ts t a g e2t h ep a r e n t ’ sﬁrst-order conditions of











k + πi − gi
k













=0 , i =1 ,2.( 3 2 )




















, i =1 ,2. (33)
Substituting (33) into πi in (32) for each i and forming the system of equa-
tions in g1
p and g2





















,i , j=1 ,2,i6= j,
(34)
which implies that there exists a certain range of income distributions among
individuals for which an interior solution occurs, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Summing (34) over i to get:














,( 3 5 )




k. Therefore, neutrality holds.


















=0 ,i=1 ,2.( 3 6 )
Diﬀerentiating (33) with respect to gi
















=1 , i =1 ,2,( 3 7 )
s i n c ei tf o l l o w sf r o m(34) that ∂ˆ gi
p/∂gi
k = −1 for i =1 ,2. Substituting (37)
into (36) results in that ∂Ui
k/∂gi
k =0for any value of gi
k, which implies that
the optimal values of gi
k are indeterminate. Moreover, since the values of
20Figure 5: The pattern of family members’ contributions to the public good
in the ex-post case
ˆ gi
p +gi
k, i =1 ,2, are uniquely determined from (34), gi
p and thus πi turn out
to be indeterminate.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of family members’ contributions to the
public good when the income distribution varies, where the interval [0,Y] rep-
resents the sum of the incomes of family 1 and 2. The distance from the ex-
treme left point labelled by 0 in Figure 5 represents the total income of family
1, while the rest of the interval [0,Y] does the total income of family 2.I ft h e
total income of family 1 is less than (1+α)Y/(2+2α+γp+αγk),t h e nn o n eo f
the members of family 1 contributes to the public good, while the only mem-
bers of family 2 contribute. If the total income of family 1 i sl o c a t e di nt h ei n -
terval
£
(1 + α)Y/(2 + 2α + γp + αγk), (1 + α + γp + αγk)Y/(2 + 2α + γp + αγk)
¤
,
the members of both families contribute. If the total income of family 1 is
larger than (1+α+γp +αγk)Y/(2+2α+γp +αγk), then the only members
of family 2 contribute. Note further that the division between gi
p and gi
k is




In this subsection we consider the pre-committed case. Assuming that every
family member makes a positive contribution to the public good, the child’s













=0 , i =1 ,2,












































, i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. (38)
Summing over i yields


















Given (38) and (39),t h ep a r e n t ’ sﬁrst-order conditions of the respective
















































∂πi =0 . (41)
Diﬀerentiating (38) with respect to gi














, i =1 ,2, (42)
which together implies that ∂ˆ gi
k/∂gi
p =1− (∂ˆ gi
k/∂πi). Using this fact, we
can conﬁrm that (40) and (41) coincide. Hence, the division between gi
p and
πi is indeterminate.









































k for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j.
Solving (43) for πi + gi















, i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. (44)
Substituting (44) into πi + gi
p (i =1 ,2)i n(39) results in
ˆ G = ∆
−1γk(α + γp + αγk)Y, (45)
22Figure 6: The pattern of family members’ contributions to the public good
in the pre-committed case.




. These results establish neutrality.




























, i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. (46)
Using (46), we can draw Figure 6 which shows the behavior of family
members’ contributions to the public good when the income distribution
varies. Figure 6 exhibits the same features as those in Figure 6 except for the
critical levels of income at which the respective family’s members alternate
their contributions between a positive amount and a zero.
6.3 Mix of Ex-post and Pre-committed Transfers
Given (g1
k, π2, g2
p) and assuming interior solutions for ˆ g1
p, ˆ π
1 and ˆ g2
k,a ts t a g e






(1 + γk)(γp + αγk)(y1
k + y1
p) − (1 + α)γk(y2
k + g2
p + π2)
γk(1 + α)+( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)






p + π2) − [γk +( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)]y1
k
γk(1 + α)+( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)
+ g
1




γk(1 + α + γp + αγk)(y2




γk(1 + α)+( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)
.( 4 9 )
Manipulating (47) and (49), and adding g2
p yields












k + π2 + g2
p)
γk(1 + α)+( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)
.( 5 0 )
23Given the optimal contribution functions ˆ g1
p, ˆ π
1, ˆ g2
k in (47)-(49) and the
total provision of ˆ G in (50), the parent’s decision problem of family 2 at stage

















































γk(1 + α)+( 1+γk)(γp + αγk)
=0 . (52)
Diﬀerentiating ˆ g2
k given by (49) with respect to g2













which renders the parent’s ﬁrst-order conditions (51) and (52) become iden-
tical. As a result, the division between π2 and g2
p is indeterminate, although
π2 + g2



















γp + γk + αγk
¢
+ γk
.( 5 3 )
Further substitution of (53) into (50) yields
ˆ G = Γ
−1αγk
¡
γp + γk + αγk
¢
Y ,( 5 4 )
where Γ ≡
£


















(1 + γk)(γp + αγk)α
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p) − αγk(1 + α)
¡









12Although we can verify that the total provision of the public good in the ex-post case,
(35), is larger than that at the pre-committed case, (45),i ti sn o tp o s s i b l et or a n kb e t w e e n
either of them and the total provision level in the mixed case, (54).
24Figure 7: The pattern of family members’ contributions to the public good








αγk(1 + α + γp + αγk)
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Using (55) and (56), we can draw Figure 7 which shows the behavior of family
members’ contributions to the public good when the income distribution
varies. Figure 7 exhibits the same features as those in Figures 5 and 6 except
for the critical levels of income at which the respective family’s members
alternate their contributions between a positive amount and a zero.
7 Impure Altruism







































k,G), i =1 ,2, (58)
w h i l et h er e s to ft h em o d e li st h es a m ea sb e f o r e .
Abel and Bernheim (1991) show that, under the utility function (58)
with the preference toward the size of the transfers the parent makes rather
than the total provision of the public good, Bernheim and Bagwell’s cross
sectional neutrality fails to hold, while Andreoni (1990), and Cornes and
Sandler (1984) show that under the utility function (57), without the prefer-
ence toward the welfare of the child, Warr’s neutrality theorem fails. We ﬁrst
examine the neutrality issue under the utility function (58). Assuming the
25ex-post transfers made by the parents of both families, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for an interior solution are given by (6), which is modiﬁed by adding




















=0 , i =1 ,2.
(59)
Under the hypothetical changes prescribed by (10) and (11),t h ea b o v e
ﬁrst-order conditions (6) and (59) are not satisﬁed at the original values of ci
p,
ci
k and G, because πi is free to change. Instead, assuming πi to be ﬁxed at the





k, i =1 ,2. It is easy to see that under these hypothetical
changes the allocation of resource allocation remains unchanged and thus
neutrality holds, yet the indeterminacy between gi
p and πi clearly disappears.
Similarly, as long as an interior equilibrium is assumed, the neutrality and
uniqueness of an equilibrium allocation are robust regardless of the diﬀerent
timings of parental transfers.
Under the utility function (57), on the other hand, we consider the hypo-
thetical changes given by dyi
p = dπi and dyi
k +dπi = dgi
k, i =1 ,2, keeping gi
p
unchanged. In a similar way, we can show that the neutrality and uniqueness
of the equilibrium allocation hold.
In either case, since one of the parent’s choice variables such as πi or gi
p
does not appear in the utility function as a single element and thus the ﬁrst-
o r d e rc o n d i t i o n ,t h a tv a r i a b l ei sa b l et of r e e l yc h a n g es oa st on e u t r a l i z et h e
eﬀect of income redistribution policy. Nevertheless, the presence of imperfect
altruism will eliminate the non-uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium allocation
even in an interior equilibrium, because one of the variables gi
p and πi should
be kept at the original value in order to realize neutrality; consequently,
it should be uniquely determined so as to satisfy the relevant ﬁrst-order
condition. Moreover, when both types of impure altruism are simultaneously
present; that is, the parent’s (or child’s) utility function depends directly
and individually both on her own transfers as well as on her own private
contribution, even neutrality no longer holds true.13










k,G), the property of indeterminacy recovers because the ﬁrst-order conditions
f o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni nt e r m so fgi
p and πi become identical due to perfect substitutes
between gi
p and πi.
268 Household Public Goods
In this last section we consider a two-stage contribution game where family
members contribute to both a household, or intrafamily, public good and an
interfamily public good. Due to space limitations, we shall consider only the




















i,G), i =1 ,2, (60)
where Hi represents a household public good which beneﬁts only the mem-
bers of family i, and the other notations are the same as before. The budget




















i,( 6 2 )
where hi
p and hi
k represent the contributions made by the parent and child
of family i to the household public good, respectively, and Hi = hi
p + hi
k.
We use backward induction to solve the parent’s optimization problem

















































































=0 , i =1 ,2.( 6 6 )
Since (64), (65) and (66) form the system of equations in gi
p, hi
p and πi,






















k), i =1 ,2. Given these functions, the



































































































































=0 , i =1 ,2.( 6 8 )
In order to prove the validity of the neutrality property in terms of income
redistribution, given a set of changes in incomes dyi





k =0 , we consider a set of changes in choice





















p =0 , i =1 ,2.
These hypothetical responses, in conjunction with the budget constraints










































In addition, the constancy of the variables ci
p, ci
k, Hi and G leaves the ﬁrst-
order conditions (64), (65), (66), (67) and (68) intact as well.
28Two remarks are in order. First, an inﬁnite number of combinations of
dπi, dgi
p and dhi
p hold under the above hypothetical changes, thus leading to
the indeterminacy property. Second, even if due to the traditional gender
roles of husband and wife — emphasized by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) —
or productivity diﬀerence in supplying household public goods — emphasized
by Konrad and Lommerud (1995) — either the parent or child is at a corner
solution as a contributor to the intrafamily public good, income redistribution
does not distort the real allocation as long as the channels of voluntary income
transfers and/or contributions to the interfamily public good are operative,
that is, neutrality as well as indeterminacy continue to hold in our augmented
model. This outcome stems from the property uncovered by Corollary 1, i.e.,
if everyone is linked, neutrality remains eﬀective. Although this ﬁnding seems
to be inconsistent with the result of Konrad and Lommerud (1995) where the
productivity diﬀerence between spouses undermines the neutrality property,
it is not. This diﬀerence stems from the fact that their model contains neither
the contributions to interfamily public goods nor voluntary income transfers.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that when parents voluntarily and simultane-
ously make both private donations to public goods and transfers to children
in an interior equilibrium, the contributions made by parents are indetermi-
nate. In other words, in a two-stage Nash provision game an inﬁnite number
of combinations of individual contributions and transfers are sustained as a
( s u b g a m ep e r f e c t )N a s he q u i l i b r i u mw i t hau n i q u ep r o ﬁle of every individ-
ual’s consumption as well as the total supply of public good, regardless of
whether the parents decide to make parent-to-child transfers before or after
having observed the contributions made by the children. However, the in-
troduction of some friction such as impure altruism with respect to either
her own private donations or her own intrafamily transfers eliminates such
indeterminacy, although neutrality may still remain valid.
The neutrality result established in this paper has two important policy
implications. First, Bergstrom et al. (1986) point out that if the redistrib-
ution of income from non-contributors to contributors takes place, not only
neutrality fails, but also total provision of the public good will increase. In
contrast to their claim, in our multi-family setting there is the possibility that
neutrality continues to hold under such a redistribution, as long as intrafam-
ily transfers are operative. On the other hand, even if most interfamily links
through transfers are not operative, Bernheim and Bagwell’s cross sectional
neutrality may survive because the private donations to interfamily public
29goods are eﬀectively perfect substitutes for interfamily private transfers.
Since the seminal paper of Konrad and Lommerud (1995), most house-
hold economists tend to believe that the redistribution policy between fam-
ily members is not neutral, and, moreover, there is the possibility of Pareto
improvement. However, our paper casts doubt on the robustness of this
non-neutrality result at least from a theoretical viewpoint, since there are
various channels between family members which may undo the eﬀectiveness
of redistribution policy.
There are extensions in several directions. First, a natural extension is to
combine the present non-cooperative multi-family model with the coopera-
tive or Nash bargaining (single) family model such as Lundberg and Pollak
(1993), Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Chen and Woolley (2001). This ex-
tension would further provide richer implications. Our analysis suggests that
the threat points, and the cooperative Nash bargaining solutions of the mod-
els of Lundberg and Pollak, Konrad and Lommerud are highly likely to be
independent of the non-wage incomes. This conjecture may not hold in the
bargaining model of Chen and Woolley, where bargaining is over income
transfers rather than private consumption allocations. Therefore, these con-
jectures call for further examination of their models under our setting. Sec-
ond, it is also interesting to investigate the case of several children, possibly
coupled with the endogenous fertility decision of the parent. It would be
interesting to introduce intragenerational conﬂict among children, e.g., chil-
dren’s transfer seeking activities proposed by Chang (2009) into the present
model. Although the analysis will be complicated, we expect that our basic
results would be still valid.
Appendix A











































































































































































=0 , i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.( A 2 )
Appendix B
In order to show that the ﬁrst-order conditions (19) and (20) reduce to a


































































































































where |B| represents the determinant of the matrix appearing on the left-
hand side of (B1).





































































, i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.
(B8)



























∂πi, i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j. (B10)
Appendix C
In order to prove that (27) and (28) holds true, we totally diﬀerentiate (??),













































































































⎦.( C 1 )































∂π2.( C 2 )
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